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Over the last 150 years, human manual reaction times (RTs) have been recorded countless
times. Yet, our understanding of them remains remarkably poor. RTs are highly variable
with positively skewed frequency distributions, often modeled as an inverse Gaussian
distribution reflecting a stochastic rise to threshold (diffusion process). However, latency
distributions of saccades are very close to the reciprocal Normal, suggesting that
“rate” (reciprocal RT) may be the more fundamental variable. We explored whether this
phenomenon extends to choice manual RTs. We recorded two-alternative choice RTs
from 24 subjects, each with 4 blocks of 200 trials with two task difficulties (easy vs.
difficult discrimination) and two instruction sets (urgent vs. accurate). We found that rate
distributions were, indeed, very close to Normal, shifting to lower rates with increasing
difficulty and accuracy, and for some blocks they appeared to become left-truncated, but
still close to Normal. Using autoregressive techniques, we found temporal sequential
dependencies for lags of at least 3. We identified a transient and steady-state component
in each block. Because rates were Normal, we were able to estimate autoregressive
weights using the Box-Jenkins technique, and convert to a moving average model using
z-transforms to show explicit dependence on stimulus input. We also found a spatial
sequential dependence for the previous 3 lags depending on whether the laterality of
previous trials was repeated or alternated. This was partially dissociated from temporal
dependency as it only occurred in the easy tasks. We conclude that 2-alternative choice
manual RT distributions are close to reciprocal Normal and not the inverse Gaussian.
This is not consistent with stochastic rise to threshold models, and we propose a simple
optimality model in which reward is maximized to yield to an optimal rate, and hence an
optimal time to respond. We discuss how it might be implemented.
Keywords: reaction times, latency, reciprocal Normal, autoregressive integrated moving average (ARIMA), speed-
accuracy trade-off, Pieron’s law, optimality
INTRODUCTION
Reaction times (response times, latency) (RTs) have been mea-
sured and discussed innumerable times since their first mea-
surements in the mid-19th century by von Helmholtz (1850)
and Donders (1969). RT experiments are so commonplace
that they have become a standard paradigm for measuring
behavioral responses, often with scant regard to any underly-
ing process. However, the mechanisms behind RTs are complex
and poorly understood. A common view is that RTs reflect
processing in the time-domain, where RTs are the sum of
independent sequential processes including conduction delays,
decision-making processes, and motor responses. We ques-
tion this very fundamental assumption and consider responses
in the rate-domain, where rate is defined as the reciprocal
of RT.
One of the most perplexing aspects of RTs is their extreme
variability from one trial to the next with some very long
RTs, even when the same stimulus is repeated and subjects are
instructed to respond as quickly as possible. As exemplified by
the saccadic system, why does it take hundreds of milliseconds
to decide to make a saccade, when the saccade itself only
takes a few tens of milliseconds to execute (Carpenter, 1981)?
Moreover, if we accept that point-to-point movements, such as
saccades and arm reaching are time-optimal (Harris andWolpert,
1998), should we not expect the RT also to be optimized? One
is then led to wonder how such long response times could
be optimal.
DRIFT DIFFUSION MODELS (DDM)
The most popular explanation for the variability of RTs has
revolved around the putative mechanism of an accumulator or
“rise to threshold” model. A signal, ρ(t), increases (accumu-
lates) in time until it crosses a boundary (“trigger level” or
“decision threshold”), θ(t), whereupon the response is initi-
ated (first-passage time; Figure 1A). Typically, ρ(t) is assumed
to be a stochastic signal reflecting the accumulation of “infor-
mation” for or against an alternative until a predetermined level
of confidence is reached represented by a constant θ(t) (Ratcliff,
1978) (Figure 1B). A simple reaction time is modeled by a sin-
gle boundary, and a two-alternative choice task is modeled by
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FIGURE 1 | Illustration of accumulator models: (A) general
first-passage scheme where a triggered event occurs when a signal
ρ(t) first crosses the trigger level θ (t). Note that crossing is a solution to
the equation ρ(t) = θ (t); (B) in the diffusion model ρ(t) increases
stochastically and triggers a response when it reaches a constant θ (t), or
“threshold.” The signal is assumed to be a Wiener process, and the first
passage time is a within-trial random variable (shaded curve) with an
inverse Gaussian distribution. In the rate domain (right column) the rate
distribution remains positively skewed; (C) the diffusion model for two
boundaries, where boundary θ1(t) determines correct responses, and
boundary θ2(t) determines error responses. In the rate domain, rate of
correct responses remains positively skewed. (D) In the deterministic
model, ρ(t) increases linearly and deterministically until the threshold is
reached. It is assumed that the slope of rise is a between-trial Normal
random variable and gives rise to a reciprocal Normal distribution. In the
rate domain, rate is distributed with a truncated Normal distribution.
two boundaries. A RT is then first-passage time for one of the
alternatives plus any other “non-decision” time such as senso-
rimotor delays (e.g., Ratcliff and Rouder, 1998; Ratcliff et al.,
1999).
Typically, ρ(t) is assumed to drift with a constant mean
rate but is instantaneously perturbed by a stationary Normal
white noise process (Wiener process), so that within a given
trial and with one boundary, the time of crossing the thresh-
old is a random variable with an inverse Gaussian distribution
(Schrodinger, 1915; Wald, 1945). With two boundaries, the first
passage time for one boundary indicates the decision time for
a correct response, and an error response for the other bound-
ary; their probability density functions (pdf ’s) are computed
numerically (Ratcliff, 1978; Ratcliff and Tuerlinckx, 2002) (see
Table 1 for pdf ’s). For an easy choice task (i.e., high drift rate
toward the “correct” boundary), the pdf will approach the inverse
Gaussian distribution as error rate become negligible. Although,
there are numerous variations on this theme (e.g., Ratcliff and
Rouder, 1998, 2000; Smith and Ratcliff, 2004; Bogacz et al., 2006;
Ratcliff and Starns, 2013), they share the same basic stochastic
rise to threshold decision-making process in the time-domain.
It has been recently shown how the pure diffusion process
(without variability across trials) has an exact equivalent in
terms of Bayesian inference (Bitzer et al., 2014). As shown by
Bogacz et al. (2006), the DDM is optimal in the sense that for
a given boundary (decision accuracy) the decision is made in
minimal time.
Ratcliff (1978) also allowed the mean drift rate to fluc-
tuate between trials with a Normal distribution to reflect
“stimulus encoding” variability. This version has often been
called the extended DDM, which also includes variability in
the starting point of drift, and variability in the non-decision
component (Ratcliff and Tuerlinckx, 2002). The extended
DDM has been used to describe simple RT experiment
(Ratcliff and van Dongen, 2011) and choice RT (Ratcliff, 1978;
Hanes and Schall, 1996; Ratcliff and Rouder, 1998; Schall, 2001;
Shadlen and Newsome, 2001; Ratcliff et al., 2003, 2004; Smith and
Ratcliff, 2004; Wagenmakers et al., 2004; Ratcliff and McKoon,
2008; Roxin and Ledberg, 2008).
Although the multi-parameter extended DDM is claimed to
fit observations, a serious problem has emerged from the eye
movement literature, when we consider the distribution of the
reciprocal of RTs, which we call “rate.”
THE RECIPROCAL NORMAL DISTRIBUTION
Investigations into the timing of saccades for supra-threshold
stimuli have shown that the frequency distribution of simple RTs
(latency) is close to the reciprocal Normal distribution; that is,
rate has a near-Normal distribution. Small deviations from true
Normal are observed in the tails, but probit plots are typically lin-
ear between at least the 5th and 95th centiles (Carpenter, 1981).
The reciprocal Normal is not known to be a first-passage dis-
tribution for a constant threshold, and is easily distinguished
from the inverse Gaussian or the two-boundary pdf. Carpenter
has proposed the LATER model in which the rise to threshold
is linear and deterministic, but the slope of rise varies from trial
to trial with a Normal distribution (Carpenter, 1981; Carpenter
and Williams, 1995; Reddi and Carpenter, 2000) (Figure 1D).
If Carpenter’s findings can be generalized beyond saccades, they
are equivalent to the extended DDM without fluctuation in the
rise of ρ(t) (i.e., no diffusion) and with only one threshold.
There is an obvious difficulty in how to explain a determinis-
tic rise to threshold based on a Bayesian update rule, which is
inherently stochastic. Moreover, if the rise is deterministic then
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Table 1 | Left column: mathematical expressions of the probability density functions (pdf’s) for RTs for a single boundary diffusion model, two
boundary diffusion model, and the reciprocal Normal.
Time-domain Rate-domain
Inverse Gaussian
IG(μ, σ 2) =
(
μ3
2πσ 2χ3
) 1
2
exp
[
−μ(χ − μ)2
2σ 2χ
] Reciprocal inverse Gaussian
recIG(μ, σ 2) =
(
μ3
2πσ 2χ
) 1
2
exp
[
2μ2 − μ/χ − χμ3
2σ 2
]
First passage time distribution for the boundary of the two
boundaries a and b for the pure DDM with diffusion constant, s
B(ξ, a, b, z) = πs
2
(a − b)2 exp
[
ξ (a − z)
s2
− ξ
2t
2s2
]
∞∑
k = 1
k exp
[
− k
2π2s2t
2(a − b)2
]
sin
[
kπ (a − z)
a − b
]
Reciprocal first passage time distribution boundary a of the two boundaries a
DDM
recB(ξ, a,b, z) = πs
2
t2(a − b)2 exp
[
ξ (a − z)
s2
− ξ
2
2ts2
]
∞∑
k = 1
k exp
[
− k
2π2s2
2t(a − b)2
]
sin
[
kπ (a − z)
a − b
]
see Ratcliff and Smith (2004)
Reciprocal truncated Normal
rectrN(μ, σ ) =
exp
[
− (1/t−μ)22σ2
]
√
2π
(
1 − φ (− μ
σ
))
σ t2
Truncated Normal
trN(μ, σ ) =
exp
[
− (t−μ)22σ2
]
√
2π
(
1 − ϕ (− μ
σ
))
σ

 = Normal cdf; ξ = drift rate; a = upper boundary; b = lower boundary; z = starting point. Right column: equivalent pdf’s in the rate (reciprocal RT) domain. See
Harris and Waddington (2012) for the mathematical relationship between the two domains.
the time to reach threshold is known at the outset, and any
competition among alternatives can be resolved very quickly—so
why wait?
The reciprocal Normal is a bimodal distribution with positive
and negative modes. In the time-domain this would imply very
large negative RTs, which would require the response to occur
long before the stimulus onset and violate causality. Therefore,
we need to consider the reciprocal truncated Normal distribution
(rectrN), (where the Normal rate distribution is left truncated at
or near zero; see Harris and Waddington, 2012). The question is
what happens at or near zero rate? For easy tasks where RTs are
low, the probability of rate reaching zero (i.e., RT approaching
infinity) is negligible and the problem might be dismissed as a
mathematical nuance. However, for difficult tasks, the probability
becomes significant, as we have shown (Harris and Waddington,
2012). A departure from the reciprocal Normal has been reported
for saccade latency to very dim targets, but this has been mod-
eled instead as an inverse Gaussian based on a diffusion process
(Carpenter et al., 2009). Clarification is needed on what happens
when rates are low.
It has long been known that sequential effects occur in man-
ual choice RTs (Hyman, 1953). In sequences of 2-alternative
choice RT experiments, RTs may be correlated with the previous
trial (first-order) and also earlier trials (high-order). Moreover,
this sequential dependency seems to be a function of whether
a stimulus is repeated or alternated (Kirby, 1976; Jentzsch and
Sommer, 2002). Sequential dependencies cannot be explained
by within-trial noise processes, such as the DDM, unless there
are between-trial parameter changes (changes in drift rate or
threshold values). If we assume a linear dependence on history
(autoregressive model) in the rate-domain, then it could in prin-
ciple lead to convergence onto the Normal distribution via the
central limit theorem.
THE RATE-DOMAIN
It is important, therefore, to identify RT distributions, but this
is a non-trivial problem. It is difficult to distinguish among
highly skewed distributions in the time-domain. The method
of moments is infeasible due to poor convergence (the recip-
rocal Normal has no finite moments; Harris and Waddington,
2012). Maximum likelihood estimation of parameters requires
vast amounts of data to distinguish betweenmodels (Waddington
and Harris, 2012). There is also the problem of under-sampling
at extreme values (Harris and Waddington, 2012) which is fur-
ther exacerbated by the tendency of many investigators to discard
“outliers.” It is easier in the rate-domain, although large data sets
are still needed. Distributions that are less skewed than the recip-
rocal Normal (such as the inverse Gaussian) remain positively
skewed in the rate-domain, whereas the reciprocal Normal does
not. Surprisingly, there have only been a few published examples
of manual reaction times in the rate-domain (Carpenter, 1999;
Harris and Waddington, 2012), and it is conceivable that sac-
cades are somehow “special.” For example, express saccades do
not appear to have an equivalent in manual tasks. Another impor-
tant issue is lack of stationarity, where the mean and variance
(and higher moments for non-Normal distributions) change over
time. Non-stationarity of the mean is particularly troublesome
because it smears out the observed distribution making the RT
distribution more platykurtic and heavy-tailed. Non-stationarity
is more likely in long recording sessions, as subjects become
fatigued and bored by the repetitive nature of RT experiments.
Using large sample sizes from prolonged recording sessions may
be counterproductive.
When a probability density function (pdf) is known in one
domain, the pdf in the reciprocal domain can easily be found.
However, it is important to recognize this is not true for
moments. For example, the mean of the rate distribution is not
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the reciprocal of the mean of the RT distribution (Harris and
Waddington, 2012). Thus, it is not possible to infer paramet-
ric statistics of rate from RT statistics. Raw data are needed.
Therefore, our goal in this study was to explore rate-domain anal-
ysis in a typical two-choice manual RT experiment. We imposed
two tasks (instruction set) and two levels of stimulus difficulty
(brightness difference) in order to explore the effects of trunca-
tion, and we used autoregression analysis and z-transforms to
examine sequential dependency. To minimize problems of non-
stationarity, we recorded only modest block sizes (200) from
many subjects (24) and collapsed after standardization. We show
that rate is indeed near-Normal and not the reciprocal of the
inverse Gaussian. Sequential dependency is evident, but not the
cause of the near-Normality. In the discussion we propose a rate
model as an alternative to first-passage time models.
METHODS
REACTION TIME RECORDING
Subjects were 24 adults aged between 18 and 45 years old selected
through the Plymouth University paid participant pool as an
opportunity sample. Subjects were naïve to the experimental pro-
cedure. Based on self-report, all participants were required to have
normal or corrected-to-normal vision with no known neurologi-
cal conditions. This study received ethical approval from the local
ethics committee.
Stimuli consisted of two solid colored rectangles of different
luminances arranged horizontally and displayed on a computer
monitor (Hanns-G HA191, 1280 × 1024, at 60Hz). Both rect-
angles were displayed in the same green color in Red-Green-
Blue (RGB) coordinates against a gray background of luminance
37.1 cd/m2. Each rectangle subtended a visual angle of 5.5 hor-
izontal and 6.6◦ vertically, and the inner edges were separated
horizontally by 9.6◦. Viewing distance was 0.5m. Subjects were
instructed to respond to the side with brighter stimulus by press-
ing the “z” or “2” key. In the easy task (E), rectangle luminances
were 37.6 and 131.6 cd/m2, and in the difficult task (D), they were
37.6 and 37.8 cd/m2. Calibration was made with a KonicaMinolta
LS-100 luminancemeter. All luminances and ambient room light-
ing were held constant for all subjects. The luminances in the (E)
and (D) tasks were chosen to yield low and high error rates of 1%
and 24% for these tasks respectively based on a pilot study. Two
task instructions were used and displayed at the beginning of a
block. In the “Urgent” (U) task, the instruction was to “respond
as fast as possible,” and in the “Accurate” (A) task, to “respond as
accurately as possible.” Each subject was presented with 4 blocks
of 200 trials each. Within a block each trial consisted of the same
combination of stimulus and task, either AE, AD, UE, or UD.
There were 24 different permutations of blocks, and the order was
balanced such that each of the 24 subjects had a unique order. We
refer to the “easy” tasks as AE and UE, and the “difficult” tasks as
AD and UD.
On each trial the subject was prompted to press the space
key to commence the trial and a cross appeared in the cen-
ter of the screen for 500ms. Subsequently, the two rectangles
appeared after a constant foreperiod of 500ms. For choice reac-
tion time experiments (unlike simple reaction time experiments),
constant and variable foreperiods have similar effects (Bertelson
and Tisseyre, 1968). We chose constant to avoid introducing
additional variability into the decision process (see Discussion).
Stimulus onset was also highly salient, even in the difficult tasks,
due to the highly visible colored rectangles. The stimuli remained
on screen until a response was made or until a time-out of 60 s
occurred (see Harris and Waddington, 2012 for a discussion on
the importance of a long time-out). For incorrect responses, feed-
back was provided in the form of a black cross, which remained
on screen for 500ms. A rest break occurred between blocks.
Reaction times (RTs) were measured from the onset of the
stimulus presentation and recorded to the nearest millisecond.
Rates were computed by taking the reciprocal RT. Taking recip-
rocals of integer RTs magnifies the effect of the quantization and
can lead to artifactual “clumping” and “gaps” in the rate fre-
quency histograms at high values of rate. We eliminated this by
using a dithering technique, where we added a uniform float-
ing point random number between −0.5 and +0.5ms to each
RT before taking the reciprocal (see Schuchman, 1964). This has
no statistical effect in the time-domain. RTs less than 0.15 s (i.e.,
rate >6.67 s−1) were considered anticipatory and not analyzed.
MOMENTS
Sample central moments (mean, standard deviation, skewness,
and excess kurtosis) and medians were estimated for each block
for RT and rate. Note that moments of RT and rate are not recip-
rocally related, but depend on the underlying parent distribution.
However, median rate is the reciprocal of median RT (see Harris
and Waddington, 2012).
We also estimated themean and standard deviation in the rate-
domain assuming the underlying distribution was Normal. The
underlying mean and standard deviation of the Normal distri-
bution will differ from the sample mean and standard deviation
depending on how much of the underlying Normal distribution
is truncated. We therefore obtained maximum likelihood esti-
mates (MLEs) of the underlying Normal parameters from each
dataset using themle.m function. This function applied a simplex
search algorithm to find the parameters that maximized the log
likelihood of the probability density function:
f (x;μ, σ, a) =
∣∣∣∣∣∣
ϕ [(x − μ) /σ ]
1 − 
 [(a − μ) /σ ] a ≤ x < ∞
0 x < a
where x is the observed rate, μ is the mean of the underlying (un-
truncated) Normal distribution, σ is the standard deviation of the
underlying distribution, a = 1/60 = 0.0167 s−1, ϕ is the standard
Normal probability density function (pdf), and 
 is the standard
Normal cumulative distribution function (cdf).
SEQUENTIAL ANALYSIS
The partial autocorrelation function (PACF) was computed using
the parcorr.m Matlab function. The first 10 trials on each block
were omitted to avoid contamination from initial transients. The
coefficients for the firstm = 20 lags were computed for each block
and averaged across blocks. An autoregressive model (AR) was
assumed to be of the form:
rn = a1rn− 1 + a2rn− 2 + · · · + amrn−m + un (1.1)
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where ri is the response on the ith trial, aj, 1 < j < m are con-
stant weights, and ui is a stochastic input on the ith trial (negative
indices were assumed to have zero weights). The autoregres-
sive weights, aj and input ui are unknown and were estimated
using the Box-Jenkins maximum likelihood procedure. We used
the estimate.m function and an autoregressive integrated moving
average (ARIMA) model with only an autoregressive polynomial
(i.e., no non-seasonal differencing or moving average polynomi-
als). We assumed the distributional form of ui to be Normal with
constant mean and variance.
An AR model can be converted to the equivalent moving aver-
age (MA) series using the standard z-transform method. The
z-transforms Z(.)of (1.1) is
R(z) = a1z−1R(z) + a2z−2R(z) + · · · + amz−mR(z) + U(z)
where R(z) = Z(r), U(z) = Z(s). This can be viewed as a discrete
time MA system with
R(z) = B(z)U(z)where the system response of orderm is
B(z) = 1
1 − a1z−1 − a2z−2 − · · · − amz−m
To find B(z) we took a partial fraction expansion:
B(z) = ∑mi= k ρk1 − λkz−1
where λi are the roots and ρi the residues Taking the inverse z-
transform, we then have:
rn = b0un + b1un− 1 + b2un− 2 + · · · (1.2)
where uk is the stochastic input on trial k and independent of
other trial inputs, b0 = 1, and bi = ∑mi= 1 ρkλik, 1 ≤ i < ∞, and
was computed in Matlab using the roots.m and residue.m func-
tions. Note that (1.1) and (1.2) describe the same system, but
(1.1) is a feedback description, and (1.2) is the feed-forward
description. We chose 6 roots, as this encompassed the obviously
larger PACF coefficients. The roots were all within the unit circle
indicating stability and the existence of a steady-state.
STEADY-STATE TRANSFER
From (1.2) we can relate the pdf of rate (output), pr(r) to the
pdf of the input where ui are identical independent random
variables with pdf pu(u), u ≥ 0. From basic probability theory,
(Papoullis and Pillai, 2002) the steady-state output pdf is given by
the convolution sequence:
pr(r)=
[
1
|b0|pu
(
u
b0
)]
⊗
[
1
|b1|pu
(
u
b1
)]
⊗
[
1
|b2|pu
(
u
b2
)]
⊗· · ·
(1.3)
where ⊗ is the convolution operator. If pu(u) is Normally dis-
tributed then so is pr(r). If pu(u) is not Normal then pr(r) may
or may not converge to Normal depending on pu(u) and the
coefficients bi. We computed (1.3) numerically for the truncated
Normal (see Results).
Consider the case where pu(0) = c where c > 0 which
corresponds to the case of truncation and when the
RT distribution has no finite moments (see Harris and
Waddington, 2012). For one term, we have pr,1(0) = c/ |b0|.
However, with two terms (one convolution) we have
pr,2(r) = 1|b0||b1|
∫∞
0 pu
(
r − x|b0|
)
pu
(
x
|b1|
)
dx. For r = 0
and c < ∞, pr,2(r) = 0. Similarly, for all terms we must have
pr(r) = 0, so that truncation is lost and the RT distribution will
have a finite mean (but not necessarily higher moments).
RESULTS
Subjects’ RTs were clearly sensitive to the task and stimulus
manipulations, as shown by the example in Figure 2A (left col-
umn). When stimulus discriminability was easy, RT distributions
were brief with low dispersion (AE and UE), but when difficult,
they became longer and much more dispersive (AD and UD).
In the rate-domain (reciprocal RT) difficulty resulted in a shift
toward zero, but the dispersion remained similar (Figure 2A right
column). For the difficult tasks, the rate distributions appear to
approach zero and possibly became truncated. The difficulty was
also evident by the number of errors (∼25% in this example).
Similar patterns were seen in all subjects, as can be seen
from the plot of medians of RT for all subjects in Figure 2B.
Again there was much more inter-subject variability for the dif-
ficult tasks, but in the rate-domain the variability was more even
(Figure 2C). Non-parametric testing (Wilcoxon test) showed that
the medians differed significantly between the difficult and easy
discriminability (AD∪UD vs. AE∪UE: p < 0.001), and between
task instructions (AD∪AE vs. UD∪UE: p < 0.001).
We computed the sample central moments (mean, stan-
dard deviation, skewness, excess kurtosis) in the time- and
rate-domains (Figure 3) for each task for each subject. In the
time-domain (left column), the moments were strongly interde-
pendent, as expected from skewed distributions. Standard devi-
ation increased and skewness and excess kurtosis decreased with
the mean (note that skewness and kurtosis are normalized with
respect to standard deviation). In the rate-domain (right col-
umn), however, the interdependence was much weaker (note the
difference in ordinate scales).
Because of possible left truncation, we estimated the mean and
standard deviation of the putative underlying Normal rate distri-
bution using MLE (see Methods). We set the left truncation to
0.0167 s−1 corresponding to a time-out of 60 s (Figure 4). When
the sample coefficient of variation (CV) was less than 0.4 (z-
score = 2.5; line in Figure 4) the MLE estimates (circles) were
seen to agree closely with sample moments (crosses). For higher
CVs the MLE moments estimates were shifted from the conven-
tional estimates (shown by up-left lines). These shifts in MLE
moments are expected from left truncation, and are consistent
with, but not definitive of an underlying truncated Normal dis-
tribution. Therefore, we next grouped blocks according whether
their truncation was severe, “truncated” blocks (CV > 0.4), or
negligible, “untruncated” blocks (CV < 0.4).
GROUP DISTRIBUTION
In the untruncated blocks, we standardized the rate for each trial
into a z-score based on the ML mean and standard deviation of
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FIGURE 2 | (A) An example of an individual subject’s frequency
distributions of RT (left column) and rate (right column) for the 4 different
blocks (AD, accurate and difficult; AE, accurate and easy; UD, urgent and
difficult; UE, urgent and easy; see Methods). In the easy tasks, RTs are
brief with few errors (block size was 200 trials). For the difficult tasks RTs
are much more variable with about 25% error rate. In the rate-domain,
dispersion is similar for all blocks with a shift to lower rates for the difficult
tasks. Note that the shift approaches zero (arrows) suggesting possible
truncation. (B) Median RTs for all subjects showing longer RTs for difficult
blocks and more inter-subject variability. (C) Same as (B) but for median
rates showing similar inter-subject variability for all blocks.
its block, and then collapsed all trials into one group. The dis-
tribution of the untruncated group was very close to Normal
between the 5th and 95th percentile, as seen from the probit plot
(Figure 5A). There was a slight deviation in the tails. As a check
on this method, we created simulated data sets using the true
reciprocal Normal distribution with the same ML moments and
sample sizes as the empirical data. Carrying out exactly the same
analysis, the rate distribution was a perfect Normal—as expected
(Figure 5B). As a further check, we also simulated the inverse
Gaussian. Here there is no truncation issue, so we used sample
moments and sample sizes to generate the simulated data. As seen
in Figure 5C, the reciprocal distribution of the inverse Gaussian
is skewed and does not fit the Normal—as expected (Harris and
Waddington, 2012). Thus, we are confident that near Normality
is not an artifact, but reflects the underlying distribution of the
empirical rate distributions.
For the truncated blocks, we standardized as above using the
ML mean and standard deviation and collapsed into one group.
However, we only considered positive z-scores because any puta-
tive truncation would lead to under representation for negative
z-scores (we included the one block that had a slightly negative
ML mean, see Figure 3, but had no discernable effect on the plots
when excluded). As shown in Figure 6A, the collapsed distribu-
tion was close to Normal with a slight deviation above the 95th
percentile. Simulation with a true reciprocal Normal showed half
a Normal distribution, as expected (Figure 6B), and the inverse
Gaussian was not close to the truncated Normal (Figure 6C).
Thus, we conclude that at least the right half of the truncated
group are close to Normal, but not the inverse Gaussian. However,
this does not address necessarily what happens near zero rate for
each block (infra vide).
SEQUENTIAL DEPENDENCY
Temporal effects
The sequence of RTs during a block was clearly not statistically
stationary as RTs were typically longer in the first few trials than
later. This transient lasted less than 10 trials, after which a steady-
state seemed to prevail, best seen by averaging across blocks in the
time- or rate-domain (Figure 7). The transient was clearly more
pronounced for the easy than difficult tasks.
We excluded the first 10 trials of each block in order to examine
the steady-state component. The Pearson correlation coefficient
between consecutive RTs was 0.20 with 63% of these being signif-
icant at p < 0.05. In the rate-domain this increased to 0.25 with
76% being significant.
A 1-lag correlation would be expected to lead to autocorre-
lations with a geometric fall-off at higher lags. Therefore, we
examined the partial autocorrelation function (PACF) to explore
explicit dependencies up to lags of 20 (see Methods). The PACF
of rate was positive and a smoothly decreasing function of lag
with no obvious cut-off (Figure 8A filled circles). As a check, we
shuffled trials randomly within each block and found no signifi-
cant dependencies (Figure 8A open circles).When plotted against
reciprocal lag, the PACF coefficients plot was approximately linear
(Figure 8B; solid circles).
We next considered a stationary autoregressive (AR) relation-
ship of the form: rn = a1rn− 1 + a2rn− 2 + · · · + amrn−m + un
(see Equation 1.1 in Methods), where ai (1 ≤ i ≤ m) are con-
stant coefficients, un is a stochastic input on trial n, which we
assumed stationary and Normal, andm is the order of the process
(see Methods). We used the Box-Jenkins maximum likelihood
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FIGURE 3 | Sample moments for RTs (left column) and rate (right
column) plotted against mean for standard deviation (top row),
skewness (middle row), and excess kurtosis (bottom row). Each symbol
represents the moment for each block for each subject: AD- open circles; AE-
crosses; UD- open squares; UE- asterisks). Note different in ordinate scales
for RTs and rate moments.
estimation procedure (see Methods) to estimate the ai for the
first 6 lags. We only included “untruncated” blocks (CV < 0.4).
Combining all such blocks revealed that only the first 3 weights
were significantly different from zero and decreased roughly lin-
early with reciprocal lag a1, 2, 3 = {0.222, 0.104, 0.076}. The 4th
weight a4 = 0.016 was borderline (Figure 8C). We also exam-
ined the difficult and easy tasks separately, but found negligible
difference [AD∪UD: a1, 2, 3, 4 = {0.212, 0.100, 0.078, 0.016};
AE∪UE: a1, 2, 3, 4 = {0.227, 0.105, 0.076, 0.037}]. Henceforth,
we used the first 3 weights of the combined tasks.
It is possible to invert the AR process to find the input,
since from (1.1) we have un = rn − a1rn− 1 + a2rn− 2 + · · · +
amrn−m, and the resulting un should have no sequential depen-
dency. To test this, we estimated the un sequence from each block
and re-computed the mean PACF (Figure 8B open symbols).
Clearly, sequential dependency was eliminated on average with a
mean lag 1 correlation of 0.032. However, the number of blocks
that had a significant lag 1 correlation also dropped from 61 to
10%—which is close to that expected by chance. This implies that
most blocks were driven by a similar AR process.
The AR model in (1.1) has a step response which reflects the
underlying dynamics behind the steady-state response. It is easily
computed (curve in Figure 8D) and clearly similar to the empir-
ical average transient response at the beginning of each block
(grand average from Figure 7B). Thus, the transient response is
consistent with the steady-state dynamics.
Using the single-sided z-transform, we converted (1.1) to a
moving average (MA) formulation in terms of a discrete series
of independent stochastic inputs uj 1 ≤ j ≤ n (see Equation 1.2
in Methods): rn = b0un + b1un− 1 + b2un− 2 + · · · . The weights
are the feed-forward impulse response function and are plotted
against lag in Figure 9A. As can be seen, there is modest but pro-
longed dependence on input value history implying considerable
“memory.”
Assuming stationarity, one effect of the sequential dependency
is to scale the moments of the input (see Methods). Based on the
AR weights, the mean of rate was r¯ = 1.67u¯. The effect on stan-
dard deviation was small σr = 1.05(σu), and on higher moments
it was negligible. For an untruncated rate distribution, the effect
of sequential dependency was to shift the rate distribution to
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FIGURE 4 | Plot of standard deviation vs. mean of all blocks in the
rate-domain. Crosses indicate conventional sample moments (same as
top-right panel in Figure 3). Circles indicate maximum likelihood estimates
(MLE) of same blocks assuming a left truncated Normal. Line is SD =
Mean/2.5. To the right of line sample moments coincide with rectrN MLE
moments; to the left MLE moments shift to higher standard deviations and
lower means (connecting lines).
the right with minimal changes to the shape of the distribution.
Thus, we conclude the observed near-Normality of untruncated
rate distributions is not a manifestation of the central limit the-
orem arising from the sequential dependency, but must reflect
the near-Normality of the input distribution itself. Therefore,
assuming the pdf of the input pu(r) to be Normal, the output
pdf pr(r) can be computed numerically from the convolution
sequence in (Equation 1.3) (see Methods). For an “untrun-
cated” Normal input there is a shift to higher rate with neg-
ligible change in variance, as illustrated in Figure 9B. For an
input truncated at zero, there is not only a shift in the mean,
but the sharp truncation at zero is smoothed and eliminated
(which can also be demonstrated analytically; see Methods).
Remarkably, this smooth shape can also be fit very well by a recip-
rocal inverse Gaussian (dotted curve) when the tail is excluded
(see Discussion).
Spatial effects
Previous studies have shown that mean RT can depend on the
sequence of the laterality of previous trials (see Introduction),
in particular whether laterality was repeated (R) or alter-
nated (A). Thus, the sequence RRRR indicates that the stim-
ulus and the previous four stimuli were all on the same
side (i.e., all left LLLLL or all right RRRRR), whereas the
sequence AAAA means that each stimulus alternated sides
from the previous (RLRLR or LRLRL) (note the last symbol
is the current trial). Jentzsch and Sommer (2002) examined
sequences with 4 lags and showed a significant dependence of
RT on a binary weighting of the AR sequence, where R was
binary “0” and A binary “1” (e.g., RRRR = 0, RRAR = 2,
AARA = 13, AAAA = 16). We used the same scheme for
comparison.
For the easy tasks (AE and UE), averaging across all blocks
showed a significant dependence on the AR sequence [F(15, 645) =
4.58; p < 0.001] when all trials in a block were considered. In par-
ticular the sequences AARR, RRRA, RRRA, were associated with
high RTs (arrow in Figure 8), and remarkably similar to Jentzsch
and Sommer’s results. The inverse pattern was more clearly seen
in the rate-domain, with smaller and more even standard errors.
For the difficult tasks (AD and UD), there was no significant
pattern in the time- or rate-domain.
DISCUSSION
These data clearly show that when the task is easy (AE and UE
blocks), RT distributions are close to reciprocal Normal, and
not close to the inverse Gaussian distribution. Moreover, we
have demonstrated this using practical block sizes (n = 200) col-
lapsed across 24 subjects after standardization, unlike previous
studies which used very large data sets recorded from only a
few subjects. We emphasize that this near-Normality of rate was
not an artifact from collapsing across subjects, as this does not
invoke the central limit theorem, but simply combines the under-
lying distributions—as confirmed by Monte-Carlo simulations
(Figure 5B). We conclude that 2-alternative choice manual RT
distributions are very close to the rectrN distribution, similar to
the simple reaction experiments with saccades (Carpenter, 1981;
Carpenter and Williams, 1995; Reddi and Carpenter, 2000) and
the few studies of simplemanual reaction times (Carpenter, 1999;
Harris and Waddington, 2012). In simple RT studies it is neces-
sary to introduce a variable foreperiod to prevent anticipation for
the stimulus onset. In choice RT study, a foreperiod may increase
“preparedness,” but randomization is not essential, as a choice
cannot be made with confidence until the discriminative stimu-
lus appears, and Bertelson and Tisseyre (1968) have shown similar
effects for constant or random foreperiods in choice experiments.
We chose a constant foreperiod to reduce the amount of extrin-
sic variability introduced into the decision process (see Methods).
We can conclude that near-Normality in the rate domain is not
a consequence of foreperiod randomization, and by implication
presumably neither in simple RT experiments. However, this does
not eliminate a possible role of a subject’s intrinsic variability in
judging foreperiod durations (i.e., Weber’s law), and whether or
how this affects the rate distribution remains to be explored.
It is difficult to reconcile the rectrN with a pure Wiener diffu-
sion process, where within trial drift noise is Normal (Figure 1B),
as this would yield an inverse Gaussian distribution in the time-
domain, or a reciprocal inverse Gaussian in the rate-domain.
Monte Carlo simulation using the reciprocal inverse Gaussian
with moments from our subjects did not yield near Normal rates
(Figure 5C). Ratcliff (1978) considered the compound inverse
Gaussian where drift rate fluctuated between trials with another
Normal distribution. This would fit the reciprocal Normal if there
were no drift noise, which is consistent with Carpenter’s LATER
model. This strongly suggests that the underlying RT process
operates in the rate-domain, rather than in the more intuitive
time-domain. It also explains why RTs are so variable—modest
symmetric fluctuations in rate can lead to asymmetric and very
high changes in RT, especially when rate becomes small as occurs
in difficult tasks.
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FIGURE 5 | Untruncated group rate histograms (left column) and
rate probit plots (right column). (A) Empirical rate from
“untruncated” blocks (c.v. < 0.4) showing near Normal distribution
over 5–95% interval with slight deviation in the tails (B) Simulated
data using reciprocal Normal for RT distribution (see text) showing
almost perfect Normal rate distribution. (C) Simulated data using
inverse Gaussian for RT distributions showing obvious deviations from
Normal rate.
Temporal sequential dependency among trials has frequently
been observed in choice reaction experiments (Laming, 1979).
Clearly, any inter-trial correlations affect between-trial fluctu-
ations, but they have been ignored in recent models of RT
distributions. Using autoregressive techniques, we have shown
explicit dependency of rate output for at least the 3 previous tri-
als, very similar to Laming’s original finding in the time-domain.
Converting to a MA representation, this “memory” extends even
further in terms of stimulus inputs (Figure 9A). We also found a
transient response at the beginning of each block lasting less than
10 trials, which was similar to the predicted step response of the
steady-state dynamics (Figure 8D). The simplest explanation is
that the rest time between blocks allowed the memory “trace” to
decay. However, this needs further exploration since we did not
manipulate block intervals, and it was not possible to distinguish
between sequential dependencies that are based on absolute time
or based on trial number.
Based on moments, the main effect of this temporal depen-
dency was to scale the mean response rate to higher values (i.e.,
shorten RTs) with little change in variance or higher moments
(Figure 9B). One could view this as improving signal-noise ratio,
or that previous trials/stimuli provide some information about
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FIGURE 6 | Truncated group rate histograms (left column) and
rate probit plots (right column), shown only for positive
z-scores (see text). (A) Empirical rate from “truncated” blocks
(c.v. > 0.4) showing near Normal distribution over 50–95%
percentiles; (B) simulated data using reciprocal Normal RTs
showing near perfect Normal distributions (as expected). (C)
Simulated data using inverse Gaussian RTs showing obvious
deviations from Normal rate.
the upcoming stimulus (prediction), hence allowing a faster
response. Because higher moments are negligibly affected by the
MA process, we can also conclude that the temporal sequential
dependency does not cause rate to be Normal via the central
limit theorem, and we deduce that the input must already be
near-Normal.
We also found a sequential dependency that was related to the
sequence of stimulus laterality for the easy tasks. Using Jentsch
and Sommer’s binary weighting system, we found a remarkably
similar result to theirs for the easy tasks with RRRR and AAAA
having the highest rates (shortest RTs) and AAAR, RRRA, ARRA
having the lowest rates (longest RTs) (Figure 10). The weight-
ing scheme of Jentsch and Sommer’s extends backward for 4
lags and assumes binary (power function) weighting. From the
temporal viewpoint, our results suggest that the 4th lag is ques-
tionable and that weightings should follow an approximately
hyperbolic decrease. Using this scheme, the dependency becomes
even more pronounced (not shown). It is tempting to argue that
the temporal and spatial dependencies are manifestations of the
same process. Jentsch and Sommer have assumed the depen-
dency reflects a decayingmemory trace, as this would explain why
higher-order dependencies tend to be weaker when the trials are
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FIGURE 7 | Non-stationarity of responses in (A) the time-domain and
(B) the rate-domain. Means are computed across all subjects for the first
20 responses in each block; grand mean across conditions shown by thick
line. Note initial transient lasting less than 10 trials, which is more
pronounced for the AE and UE blocks.
longer in absolute time. Indeed, we found that the spatial depen-
dency was absent in the difficult tasks (Figure 10). Surprisingly,
the temporal dependency was still present and virtually identi-
cal to the easy task AR process. The reason for this is unclear at
present, but suggests that temporal and spatial dependencies can
be dissociated.
We emphasize that we have examined sequential dependency
in the rate-domain. In the rate domain, a sequence of responses is
a well-behaved stochastic process because of its near-Normality,
and this permits the wide range of standard analysis techniques
(moments, autocorrelations, spectral analyses, etc). In the time-
domain this is not necessarily the case because taking the recipro-
cal of rate is a non-linear operation. Trials with low rates become
disproportionately magnified in the time domain, which can lead
to “spikes” with very long RTs. In particular, there is the possibility
that artefacts may arise in power spectra as these spikes have high
spectral energy, and we advocate caution interpreting power spec-
tra based only on time-domain analyses (e.g., 1/f noise: Thornton
and Gilden, 2005) subject to further exploration.
TRUNCATION
Strictly, the Normal distribution has infinite extent and includes
zero and negative rates, but this is not possible in RT experiments,
so we need to consider the left-truncated Normal and the corre-
sponding reciprocal truncated Normal (Harris and Waddington,
2012). We observed that when the task became more difficult
(AD and UD), there was a leftward shift of the rate distribu-
tion (i.e., longer RTs) (Figure 2A) suggesting that left-truncation
FIGURE 8 | Sequential dependency based on blocks without transients
(first 10 trials omitted). (A) Mean partial autocorrelation function (PACF) of
all blocks (filled symbols) showing smooth decay. Lines are ± 1 standard
error. Open symbols show PACF for the same data after random shuffling
leaving no sequential dependency. (B) PACF is plotted against reciprocal of
lag showing a roughly linear increase (filled symbols). After de-correlation
(see text) PACF coefficients become negligible (open symbols). (C)
Maximum likelihood estimation of autoregressive coefficients (Equation 1.1)
using the Box-Jenkins methods (see Methods) showing linear increase with
reciprocal lag. (D) Comparison of step response function of autorgressive
model (solid curve) with observed initial transient from grand mean in
Figure 7B.
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FIGURE 9 | Moving average (MA) model (Equation 1.2) computed from
autoregressive coefficients using z-transform method (see Methods).
(A) MA coefficients show extended dependency on lag indicating memory
of input. (B) Effect of MA on a Normal input distribution with minimal
truncation. Input (μ = 2, σ = 0.3) (dashed curve) is shifted to higher rate
(solid curve) with little change in shape; (C) Input is Normal (μ = 0, σ = 0.3)
truncated at 0. Note truncation is eliminated by smoothing. Resulting pdf
could be mistaken for a reciprocal inverse Gaussian distribution (dotted
curve).
may have occurred. Because moments are sensitive to trunca-
tion, we used MLE to find the underlying Normal that fitted
each block the best, and this showed that truncation was occur-
ring (Figure 4). Collapsing across these subjects showed that the
untruncated right half of the distribution was also very close to
Normal (Figure 6A). This is a novel finding, and is evidence that
task difficulty can lead to truncated Normal rate distributions.
This has not been considered in previous models but has some
far-reaching implications.
Truncation leads to very long RTs, which could theoreti-
cally approach infinity. Such responses would not usually be
observed because either the experimenter imposes a maximum
trial duration (time-out), or because the experiment is of finite
duration in time or in number of trials. Thus, practically,
rate will appear bound at some non-zero minimum, depend-
ing of the experimental design (see Harris and Waddington,
2012 for further discussion). For easy tasks, this will have min-
imal effect since long RTs are rare, but as the task becomes
more difficult, the effect of truncation becomes increasingly
important.
Interestingly, it has been proposed that the latency distribu-
tion of saccades departs from reciprocal normal for low stim-
ulus contrasts, and that the inverse Gaussian is a better model
(Carpenter et al., 2009). However, could this instead be due
to truncation of the reciprocal Normal? Consider the theoreti-
cal example in Figure 9C, where we have set the rate standard
deviation to 0.3 s−1 with left truncation set by a mean of 0.
The effect of temporal sequential dependency is to smooth out
the truncation, which reduces the probability of very long RTs.
The resulting pdf could easily be mistaken for the reciprocal
inverse Gaussian (Figure 9C dotted curve). Thus, in the time-
domain, it is plausible that studies using the inverse Gaussian
may have overlooked the reciprocal truncated Normal with
sequential dependency as a more parsimonious and unifying
explanation.
NON-HOMOGENEITY
In this experiment we have used homogenous and stationary
blocks, where the same stimuli were used in each trial of a
block, and the laterality was random. However, many RT experi-
ments are not homogenous, and the stimulus value changes on
trials within a block. Generally, we expect that rate would no
longer be reciprocal Normal. We distinguish between discrete and
continuous non-homogeneity.
In the discrete case, a block contains a small number of
different but known stimuli that are typically randomized or
counterbalanced within the block. Assuming independent tri-
als, the observed rate on each trial would then be a single
sample from the Normal distribution associated with that stim-
ulus. The overall rate distribution would then be a mixture of
Normal distributions depending on the value and relative fre-
quency of each stimulus. Since the stimulus is known on each
trial, responses could be segregated and the rate distributions
computed. Clearly, any sequential dependency should be reduced
before segregation.
The continuous case is more problematic. It typically occurs
when task difficulty and/or stimulus value vary on every trial in
an unknown way. The rate on each trial can still be considered
as a single sample from a Normal distribution, but the mean
of the rate distribution (and possibly the standard deviation)
are continuously variable leading overall to a compound Normal
distribution, which can take on a wide range of positively or neg-
atively skewed shapes. Whether de-convolving a putative Normal
distribution is useful remains to be explored on real data.
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FIGURE 10 | Mean response time and rate plotted against the laterality
sequence of previous 4 trials: R, laterality repeated; A, laterality
alternated (after Jentzsch and Sommer, 2002). Means were computed
across all AE and UE blocks; error bars are ± 1 within standard error. Filled
symbols show means for all trials in each block; note the significant increase
in RT for RRRA sequence (row). A similar picture is seen in the rate-domain.
RATE AND OPTIMALITY
As posed in the introduction, why RTs are so variable and
whether, or under what circumstances, they could be optimal
are longstanding questions that have been asked or assumed to
be answerable by time-domain analysis (e.g., Luce, 1986; Bogacz
et al., 2006). However, our and Carpenter’s data are highly
suggestive that there exists a preferred rate, r∗, for a given set
of experimental conditions, and that rate fluctuates according to
a Normal random process from trial to trial around r∗. Clearly,
modest symmetrical variations in rate can lead to very large and
highly asymmetric fluctuations in the time domain, especially
when r∗ is small—as occurs in difficult discriminative tasks. Also
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r∗ is easily recognizable as the modal rate, but there is no obvious
landmark in the time domain: t∗ = 1/r∗ does not correspond to
the mode in the time-domain. Moreover, the rectrN is a strange
distribution without finite moments (Harris and Waddington,
2012), whereas the Normal distribution is a common basic dis-
tribution. This strongly suggests that we should be considering
rate as the more fundamental variable than RT, even if it seems
counter-intuitive.
It seems that if we accept a rise to threshold model, then we
require a deterministic drift rate that fluctuates between trials
with a truncated Normal distribution, as originally proposed by
Carpenter (1981). It is conceivable that there is still a stochas-
tic rise to threshold, but it would need to be almost completely
masked by the inter-trial variability (this needs future modeling),
and rate is still the dominant variable. However, it is impor-
tant not to conflate proximal with ultimate explanations. At the
proximal level, there must be some physiological mechanism for
triggering an all-or-none response, and an accumulator process
seems physiologically plausible. However, even if true, it only
explains how rate could be represented mechanistically, and there
is a myriad of ways in which an accumulator could be con-
structed/evolved as a trigger (e.g., linear vs. curvilinear signal rise,
deterministic vs. stochastic signal, fixed vs. variable trigger level;
Figure 1A). It does not explain why rate is important.
Rate of response may be fundamental for an organism. For
example, in the study of natural foraging, it is widely assumed
that animals seek to maximize the rate of nutrient intake, rather
than quantity per se. This has led to the marginal value theo-
rem (Charnov, 1976) which predicts the time spent by animals
on patches of food. In the study of animal learning, Skinner
introduced his famous cumulative plots as a way of visualiz-
ing the stationarity of an animal’s rate of response (Skinner,
1938; Ferster and Skinner, 1957). There is an obvious paral-
lel between RT and operant behavior. When a subject presses a
button (“operant”), she presumably derives a reward if the but-
ton press is a “correct” response, and a loss if “incorrect.” The
onset of lights acts as a “discriminant” or “conditioned” stim-
ulus that provides information about the probability of reward
(Skinner, 1938). It is well known that response times decrease
with increasing reward but also increasing intensity of the condi-
tioned stimulus (Mackintosh, 1974). Similarly, numerous studies
have shown RTs decrease with increasing reward (Takikawa et al.,
2002; Lauwereyns and Wisnewski, 2006; Spreckelmeyer et al.,
2009; Milstein and Dorris, 2011; Delmonte et al., 2012; van Hell
et al., 2012; Gopin et al., 2013) or increasing stimulus intensity
(Cattell, 1886; Piéron, 1914). This leads us to consider the pos-
sibility of maximizing expected rate of reward or utility as an
explanation for our observations (also considered by Gold and
Shadlen, 2002).
For each trial, we define the gain in subjective utility for a cor-
rect response by U+ > 0, and the loss by U− > 0. Objectively,
utility would be maximized by responding to the correct stimulus
any time after the stimulus onset. The stimulus value depends on
the temporal response of the visual system, and will also increase
in time due to any temporal integration and/or Bayesian update
of priors. We therefore denote p(t) as the subjective probability
of making a correct response given that a response occurs at t
(measured relative to some origin; see below). We assume that
p(t) is a concave function (Figure 11A), where for two alternatives
with no prior information, p(0) = 0.5.
The expected gain in utility Gˆ(t) for a response at time t is
(curve in Figure 11B):
Gˆ(t) = U+p(t) − U− (1 − p(t)) = (U+ + U−) p(t) − U−
(1.4)
It can be seen that expected gain will be negative when t < tmin,
where p(tmin) = 1/
(
U+/U− + 1). In this case, it does not pay to
respond at all, but there will always be a positive gain as p(t) → 1
and maximized by responding as late as possible. Expected rate of
gain is Rˆ(t) = Gˆ(t)/t. When rate of gain is positive, there may be
an optimal time to respond given by t∗ = argmax
t
Rˆ(t), which is
the solution to:
t∗ = Gˆ(t
∗)
Gˆ′(t∗)
(1.5)
where the dash refers to the derivative with respect to t
(Figure 11C). The conditions for a positive maximum are com-
plicated, but it occurs under quite broad conditions and is easily
visualized geometrically in Figure 11B, since from (1.4) the opti-
mum is given by the tangent of Gˆ(t) that intercepts the origin.
Thus, depending on the utility payoff ratio U+/U−, and p(t),
there is an optimal time to respond. Responding as quickly as pos-
sible is generally suboptimal—it pays to wait for a specific time to
respond.
We can make some general deductions. First, any
increase/decrease in the utility payoff ratio, U+/U−, will
reduce/increase t∗ for a concave p(t). Thus, increasing reward
will reduce t∗, as empirically observed (vide supra). In our
experiment, asking subjects to respond accurately as opposed to
quickly required “caution” by reducing the ratio and increasing
t∗ (Figure 2).
Faster/slower rise in p(t) will also reduce/increase t∗ similar
to, but not in precisely the same manner as manipulating pay-
off. For example, increasing the number of alternatives, n, will
reduce p(t) since p(0) = 1/n (given no other prior information)
and hence increase t∗. Whether there is a logarithmic relationship
between n and E[t∗] (Hick’s law) depends on the precise form of
p(t) and remains to be explored. On the other hand, any prior
information will decrease the rise-time of p(t) and reduce t∗, as
has been reported in some experiments with random foreperiods
(see Niemi and Näätänen, 1981).
Stimulus intensity has a strong inverse relationship on t∗, but
this depends on p(t). The simplest way to parameterize p(t), is to
assume that p(t) depends on a single parameter, ε, that accelerates
time so that pε(t) = p(εt). We assume that εˆ is an unbiased esti-
mate of ε and distributed Normally across trials. It follows that
Gˆεˆ(t) = Gˆ(εˆt) and Gˆ′εˆ(t) = εˆGˆ(εˆt). Then (1.5) becomes
Gˆ′(εˆt∗) = Gˆ(εˆt
∗)
εˆt∗
(1.6)
so it follows that the optimal solution t∗ is given by:
t∗ = t1
εˆ
(1.7)
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FIGURE 11 | Rate model. (A) p(t) is subjective probability of being correct
given a response is made at time t, and is assumed to be concave. Initial
value of p(t) assumes guessing with no prior information, and final value is
assumes that response will be correct given infinite time. (B) Gˆ(t) is the
expected gain in utility (Equation 1.4) for a response made at time t. Note
that gain may be negative (i.e., loss) for t < tmin (dashed curve) and no
response is optimal. (C) Rˆ(t) is the expected rate of gain in utility (Equation
1.5) which has a maximum at t∗, and can be visualized geometrically as the
point where the tangent touches Gˆ(t) in (B,D) shifting the time origin back
by γ increases t∗ by γ ′ (see text).
where t1 is the solution to (1.6) evaluated at εˆ = 1. Thus, if
each trial is optimized based on the estimate εˆ, then the optimal
time to respond is distributed with the reciprocal of the distri-
bution of εˆ and hence has a reciprocal Normal distribution, as
observed.
Since only one reward can occur per trial, we would expect trial
duration to be the more relevant epoch for response rate, rather
than decision time per se. Including an additional non-decision
time TND (foreperiod, sensorimotor delays, etc.) in the compu-
tation of estimated rate: Rˆ(t) = Gˆ(t)/(t + TND) yields the more
general equation for t∗
t∗ + TND = Gˆ(t
∗)
Gˆ′(t∗)
(1.8)
As shown in Figure 11D, including TND increases optimal
response time (relative to stimulus onset). In other words,
decision time depends on the amount of non-decision time.
FIGURE 12 | (A) Effect of scaling factor εˆ on optimal decision time t∗ for
different non-decision time TND = {0,10,100,1000} (see text). Note that t∗
and hence RT increases with TND , although asymptote is zero (not shown);
(B) same as (A) but on log-log axes (base 10) showing near power function
t∗ ≈ aε−k with k = {0, 0.82, 0.83, 0.87} and a = {25.1, 25.1, 39.8, 63.1}
from linear regressions; (C) linear plot of optimal rate r∗ vs. εˆ. Although
strictly a power function, relationship is locally quasi-linear.
Returning to the parametric model: Gˆεˆ(t) = Gˆ(εˆt), we note that
εˆ
(
t∗ + TND
) = Gˆ(εˆt∗)
Gˆ′(εˆt∗)
(1.9)
The solution is not the same as for (1.6), and requires an explicit
form for p(t). For the purposes of illustration, we assumed a sim-
ple exponential form of p(t) = 1/2 + (1 − exp ( − εˆt)) /2 and
plotted t∗ against εˆ with U+ = 1, U− = 5 and parametric in
TND (Figure 12A). As can be seen, t∗ decays with increasing εˆ but
also increases with TND. Although we did not manipulate “non-
decision” time here, others have shown that increasing foreperiod
increases RT in both simple (Niemi and Näätänen, 1981) and
choice RT (Green et al., 1983).
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For TND > 0, the relationship is still very close to a power law
with t∗ ≈ aε−k where k ≈ 0.8 (Figure 12B). In terms of rate, we
can see that as TND increases, r∗ decreases but the relationship to εˆ
is still locally close to linear even for very large TND (Figure 12C).
Thus, if εˆ is Normally distributed r∗ will also be very near Normal.
If we add sensorimotor delays γ to decision time, then we
have RT = aεˆ−k + γ which is clearly similar to Pieron’s law:
E [RT] = αI−β + γ , where α,β and γ are constants for a given
experiment and I is objective stimulus intensity. Piéron’s law was
originally found for simple RT experiments, but also holds for
choice RTs (van Maanen et al., 2012). If we assume that εˆ is
subjective estimated stimulus intensity, then we require εˆ ∝ Iβ/k
which is plausible from Steven’s power law (Chater and Brown,
1999).
MECHANISM
How optimal rate could be controlled is open to speculation. We
can see that the mechanism in Figure 1A could act as an equa-
tion solver since the time of crossing is the solution of ρ(t) = θ(t)
[more formally: the lowest real positive root of ρ(t) − θ(t)], and
when equality is reached, the behavior is triggered in real-time.
This can be mapped onto (1.5) in an infinity of ways. A simple
possibility is that a deterministic linear rise to threshold behaves
as rate-to-time converter (Figure 1C). The input Rˆ(t) is inte-
grated in time to yield a rising deterministic ρ(t) which triggers
the response when then a threshold is reached. Gold and Shadlen
(2002) proposed that an optimal decision time could be found
by an adaptive process (trial-and-error) that varies the threshold.
In this case, the distribution of decision times would be given by
the distribution of thresholds (for a fixed ρ(t)), but this hardly
explains why RTs have a near-rectrN distribution. A more par-
simonious model would be that the optimal ρ(t) is found for a
fixed threshold (i.e., Carpenter’s original model). Normally dis-
tributed estimates of ρ(t) would then yield RTs with the observed
rectrN distribution. It is possible that both threshold and ρ(t)
are variable leading to a ratio of distributions for decision time
(Waddington and Harris, 2013), although we have no evidence
for this in this experiment.
Taking a different perspective, we can draw a correspondence
between rate (responses per second) and frequency (cycles per
second), and consider control by underlying banks of oscillators
in the Fourier domain. It is conceivable that repetitive nature
of RT experiments entrain oscillator frequencies, possibly with
phase resets from the stimulus onset to allow some degree of
prediction. Our observed temporal and spatial sequential depen-
dencies could reflect this entrainment (phase-locking), and the
Normal distribution of rate could reflect sampling of subpopula-
tions of oscillators. This is speculative, but not discordant with the
known correlation between RTs and alpha brain waves (Drewes
and van Rullen, 2011; Diederich et al., 2012; Hamm et al., 2012).
SUMMARY
For 2-alternative manual choice RTs, distributions are close to
the reciprocal Normal but not close to the inverse Gaussian
distribution. This is not consistent with stochastic rise to thresh-
old models, and implies that between-trial rate (reciprocal RT)
is a fundamental variable. There are significant between-trial
temporal and spatial sequential dependencies extending back
about 3 lags. When tasks become difficult, the rate distributions
shift to the left and becomes truncated near zero. We deduced
true truncation could not occur due the sequential dependency,
but rate distributions are still close to the truncated Normal.
Responding to back-to-back sequences of hundreds of almost
identical RT trials is not a natural behavior. Nevertheless, it does
reflect decision-making when there is time pressure. We propose
that when gain in utility is an increasing concave function of
time (speed-accuracy trade-off) there emerges an optimal time
of response when time is a penalty. We propose that response
rate reflects such a process and argue against the longstanding
assumption of rise-to-threshold.
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